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Abstract—Crowdsourcing has emerged as a paradigm for leveraging human intelligence and activity to solve a wide range of tasks.
However, strategic workers will find enticement in their self-interest to free-ride and attack in a crowdsourcing contest dilemma game.
Hence, incentive mechanisms are of great importance to overcome the inefficiency of the socially undesirable equilibrium. Existing
incentive mechanisms are not effective in providing incentives for cooperation in crowdsourcing competitions due to the following
features: heterogeneous workers compete against each other in a crowdsourcing platform with imperfect monitoring. In this paper, we
take these features into consideration, and develop a novel game-theoretic design of rating protocols, which integrates binary rating
labels with differential pricing to maximize the requester’s utility, by extorting selfish workers and enforcing cooperation among
them. By quantifying necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainable social norm, we formulate the problem of maximizing
the revenue of the requester among all sustainable rating protocols, provide design guidelines for optimal rating protocols, and
design a low-complexity algorithm to select optimal design parameters which are related to differential punishments and pricing
schemes. Simulation results demonstrate how intrinsic parameters impact on design parameters, as well as the performance gain
of the proposed rating protocol.
Index Terms—Crowdsourcing contest dilemma, incentive mechanism, rating protocol, differential punishment, heterogeneous
workers, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
CROWDSOURCING has emerged as a new data-collection and problem-solving model, offering a dis-
tributed and cost-effective approach to obtain needed data
or services by soliciting contributions from a large group
of people in the online community [1]. To crowdsource a
task, the requester submits it to a crowdsourcing platform
with an associate reward. People who can accomplish the
task, called workers, can choose to work on it and devise
solutions to the requester for exchanging the payment via
the crowdsourcing platform. Over the past decade, techniques
for securing crowdsourcing operations have been expanding
steadily, so is the number of applications of crowdsourcing
[2]. However, workers in a crowdsourcing platform have the
opportunity to exhibit antisocial behaviors due to the openness
of crowdsourcing, and hence crowdsourcing is deprived of its
imaginal shine when collective efforts are derailed or severely
hindered by elaborate sabotage [3].
Motivated in part by the DARPA Network Challenge [4], a
crowdsourcing contest dilemma game was recently proposed
in [5]. It occurs a non-cooperative situation where two workers
compete for a given task in a two-stage game, where the
worker with a better solution wins the prize, and the loser
gets nothing. In the first stage, each of these two workers
determines whether he would like to devote a high level or low
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level effort. In the second stage, workers have the option of
attacking or not attacking their opponents (e.g., disrupting the
opponent’s solution, creating multiple identities to carry out a
Sybil attack, etc.) depending on whether the attack allows them
to get ahead. The equilibrium analysis shows that workers will
find enticement in their self-interest to free-ride by taking the
payment and choosing the in-house strategy (i.e., low level
effort) in the first stage, while in the second stage, the expected
number of attacks is one, regardless of any choice of intrinsic
parameters, thereby greatly reduces social utility, which is a
social dilemma.
The main reason why workers in the above two-stage game
have the incentive to free-ride and attack is the absence of pun-
ishments for such behaviors. On the one hand, self-interested
strategic workers are inclined to adjust their strategies over
time to maximize their own utilities. On the other hand, they
can not receive an direct and immediate benefit by following
the recommended strategy (choosing crowdsourcing and not
attacking in the first and second stage, respectively). Such a
conflict leads to an inevitable fact that, many workers would
be apt to free-ride to take the reward but refuse to pay efforts,
and attack their opponents in order to be in the lead. Therefore,
the main challenge in crowdsourcing competitions is how can
the requester incentivize workers to comply with the social
norm, i.e., workers who choose the crowdsourcing strategy in
the first stage and do not attack their opponent in the second
stage should be rewarded immediately, otherwise, they should
be punished.
Although a variety of incentive mechanisms based on pric-
ing, reputation and reciprocity schemes have been explored
to induce cooperation in crowdsourcing [6], [7], [8], [9],
[10], [11], existing mechanisms are not sufficiently effective
due to the following features: heterogeneous workers compete
against each other in a crowdsourcing platform with imperfect
monitoring, and they can freely and frequently change their
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2opponents. Hence, in order to compel selfish workers to follow
the social norm and overcome the inefficiency of the socially
undesirable equilibrium, it is of great importance to design
optimal incentive mechanisms by taking these features into
consideration.
In this paper, we aim to develop a novel game-theoretic
design of rating protocols to address the crowdsourcing con-
test dilemma. The main topic of this paper is to maximize
requesters’ utilities by extorting selfish workers and enforcing
cooperation among them, i.e., paying workers as little as possi-
ble while providing sufficient incentives for individual workers
to follow the social norm in order to sustain high-performance
crowdsourcing platform, and thus evade socially undesirable
equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, standing from the
requester’s point of view to maximize his utility in all time
periods is rarely studied by other works. We believe studies
on this topic is urgent since cost-efficiency is one of the main
attractions of crowdsourcing, requesters may not have enough
incentive to post tasks via a crowdsourcing platform if they
cannot earn enough benefit. In this paper, we analyze how
cooperation can be enforced and how to maximize the utility
of a requester under the designed rating protocol by extorting
selfish workers and enforcing cooperation among them. Our
work is based on game theory because it has been found to be
a powerful tool to study strategic interactions among selfish
and rational individuals and design incentive mechanisms to
stimulate cooperation among them [12], [13], [14].
A. Main Contributions
The following is a list of our main contributions.
• Standing at the protocol designer’s point view, we ex-
plore the strategy of requesters aiming to maximize
their utilities on all tasks and provide workers sufficient
incentives of contributing good behaviors in order to
sustain high-performance crowdsourcing. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work achieving extortion
and cooperation simultaneously in crowdsourcing com-
petitions.
• Workers’ heterogeneity is taken into consideration when
designing utility functions of a worker in the two-stage
game, and thus we model the crowdsourcing contest
dilemma as an asymmetric game. This makes our rat-
ing protocol applicable in heterogeneous crowdsourcing
platforms.
• A novel game-theoretic design of rating protocols that
integrate binary rating labels with differential pricing
is developed to incentivize workers to contribute good
behaviors. Our rating protocol can achieve the social op-
timum, which is easy to design and flexible to implement.
• Differential punishments are used to transfer payoffs from
low-rating workers to high-rating workers, which can
reduce performance loss in the presence of imperfect
monitoring while providing sufficient incentives for in-
dividual workers to follow the social norm.
• The problem of designing an optimal rating protocol that
maximizes the revenue of the requester among all sustain-
able rating protocols is formulated, we rigorously analyze
how heterogeneous workers’ behaviors are influenced by
intrinsic parameters and design parameters as well as the
workers’ evaluation of their individual long-term utilities,
in order to characterize the optimal design.
• A low-complexity algorithm is proposed to select optimal
design parameters which are related to differential pun-
ishments and pricing schemes. Simulation results show
the validity and effectiveness of our proposed algorithm
for crowdsourcing contest dilemma.
B. Related Work
In recent decades, it has already been noticed that there is
an urgent need to stimulate cooperation among self-interested
workers in crowdsourcing by introducing incentive mechanism
[7], [8], [15]. There exist many types of incentive mechanisms
such as pricing and reputation [16]. Incentive mechanisms
based on pricing incentivize individuals to provide good
behaviors relying on monetary or matching rewards in the form
of micropayments, which in principle can achieve the social
optimum by internalizing external effects of self-interested
individuals [17], [18]. However, as pointed out by [9], [19]
and [20], if an inefficient pricing based incentive mechanism
is applied, “free-riding” happens when rewards are paid before
a task starts, a worker always has the incentive to take the
reward but refuse to devote efforts, whereas if rewards are
paid after the task is complete, “false-reporting” arises since
the requester has the incentive to lower or refuse the reward
to workers by lying about the outcome of the task. Incentive
mechanisms based on reputation scheme, on the other hand,
take individuals’ reputation into consideration, which reward
and punish individuals according to individuals’ past behaviors
[10], [21], [22], [23]. A central reputation entity can offer
a robust method to sustain cooperation [24]. However, such
an approach needs necessary traffic monitoring mechanisms,
which will put a great burden on the central entity, and make it
impractical in a large community. Alternatively, a distributed
adaptive reputation scheme was proposed to provide a dy-
namical updating of reputation [25]. The distributed reputation
scheme, which does not rely on a central bank to control the
currency, involves more complicated reputation update [26].
Traditional pricing and reputation schemes being used sep-
arately may be inefficient in a crowdsourcing contest dilemma
game in which workers are part of a community and repeatedly
interact. This is because workers’ behaviors are influenced
by incurred costs and designed payment, as well as their
long-term utilities, which cannot be solely determined by a
pricing scheme. Besides, workers choose to crowdsource and
devise solutions in exchange for payment, increasing work-
ers’ reputation without differential payment cannot decrease
their malicious behaviors. Recently, a considerable amount of
efforts have been devoted using game theory to analyze how
to maximize the social welfare while enforcing cooperation
among individuals under a designed incentive mechanism [14],
[27], [28], [29], [30]. Such incentive mechanisms are based
on the principle of reciprocity and can be classified into direct
reciprocity and indirect reciprocity [31]. In a direct reciprocity
mechanism, individuals can identify each other, and behaviors
3between them are based on their personal experience with
each other. Direct reciprocity mechanism is highly effective in
sustaining cooperation in a small system where individuals can
identify each other and interact frequently with fixed partners
[32]. However, in most crowdsourcing platforms, workers have
asymmetric service requirements and they can freely and fre-
quently change their partners. Hence a personal history of past
reciprocation with the same partner cannot be established. To
encourage self-interested workers to provide good behaviors
in crowdsourcing platforms, indirect reciprocity solutions have
been proposed [28], [33], in which individuals decide their
actions based on the available information including indirect
information. Hence, an individual can be rewarded or punished
by other individuals in a crowdsourcing platform even they
have not had past interactions with him [34].
To implement indirect reciprocity in crowdsourcing, it is
important to share as little as possible but enough amount of
information about past interactions in a platform. The use of
rating labels as a summary record of an individual requires
significantly less amount of information being maintained,
hence, the rating based incentive mechanism has a potential
to form a basis for successful incentive mechanisms in a
crowdsourcing platform. M. Kandori original proposes a rating
protocol for a large anonymous society [35], in which each
individual is attached a rating label based on the individual’s
past behaviors indicating his social status in the system.
Under a rating protocol, the rating label of an individual
who complies with (resp. deviates from) the social norm goes
up (resp. down), and individuals with different rating labels
are treated differently by the other individuals they interact
with. Hence, an individual with high/low rating label can be
rewarded/punished by other individuals in the crowdsourcing
platform who have not had past interactions with him. Re-
cently, a variety of rating protocols have been explored to force
cooperation in crowdsourcing platforms [11], [34], [36], [37],
[38]. However, as shown in [6], several factors hinder the direct
implementation of these works in crowdsourcing competitions.
These factors can be summarized as: (i) competitive relations
exist not only between workers, but also between workers
and requesters; (ii) In the presence of imperfect monitoring,
individual’s rating may be inaccurate; (iii) workers can freely
and frequently change their opponents in the two-stage game.
Because of these features of crowdsourcing competitions,
it is important to overcome the inefficiency of the socially
undesirable equilibrium by designing a novel rating protocol.
In our previous work [6], we have designed a rating protocol
based on game theory to address the crowdsourcing contest
dilemma. In such a rating protocol, we capture the fundamental
aspect of providing necessary and sufficient incentives for
workers to contribute good behaviors. Yet, it only considered
the expected one-period utility. As a result, incentives for
requesters to crowdsource task will be greatly reduced or
eliminated, because no requester will choose to crowdsource
tasks if they pay more than they earn. Therefore, from the
protocol designer’s point of view, it is crucial to maximize
requesters’ utilities while sufficient incentives are provided
for workers to contribute good behaviors in order to sustain
high-performance in the crowdsourcing. Besides, our previ-
Table I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS IN THIS PAPER
Notations Physical Meanings
ci cost of the ith-worker in the first stage.
si cost of the ith-worker in the second stage.
d damage inflicted by an attack.
εi probability that errors occur in the ith-stage game.
δ discount factor to denote workers’ patience.
α The strength of reward imposed to workers.
β strength of punishment imposed to workers.
γθ payment rewarded to θ-worker.
P rating protocol.
θ rating label.
Θ set of rating labels.
σ social strategy.
τ rating scheme.
ψ pricing scheme.
v expected one-period utility of a worker.
v∞ expected long-term utility of a worker.
u expected one-period utility of a requester.
UP social utility under the rating protocol P
ous work assumes that workers are homogenous, which is
a strong assumption as many crowdsourcing scenarios are
heterogeneous in the sense that workers’ abilities are different.
Therefore, in order to apply the designed rating protocol
to heterogeneous crowdsourcing platforms, it is necessary to
take workers’ heterogeneity into consideration when designing
utility functions.
C. Paper Organization
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In sec-
tion II, we describe the crowdsourcing contest dilemma game
with rating protocols. In section III, we formulate the problem
of designing an optimal rating protocol with constraints. Then
we design the optimal rating protocols in Section IV. Section
V presents simulation results to illustrate key features of the
designed rating protocol. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
A. System Setting
In a crowdsourcing contest dilemma game [5], [6], two
competing workers interact with each other in a two-stage
game to obtain a better solution to a task which can be
crowdsourced. In the first stage, each of these two workers
can choose to achieve a given task via crowdsourcing (denoted
as C) or solve the problem in-house (denoted as S). As
any C strategy is costly, and workers’ costs are different
by considering their heterogeneity, we assume that the ith-
worker will consume a cost ci ∈ (0, 1) for selecting C, while
the cost is approximated to 0 if choosing S. In the second
stage, workers decide whether or not to attack their opponents
(attacking is denoted by A, while not attacking is denoted
by N). Similarly, an attack is costly, we assume that the ith-
worker will consume cost si ∈ (0, 1) to attack his opponent,
in order to inflict the damage d ∈ (0, 1) (the attacking process
is socially valuable only if si ≤ d). Each one of ci, si and d
can be referred to as a fraction of the total reward γ, which is
normalized to be 1. The discount factor δ is the rate at which a
4Table II
THE EXPECTED PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE FIRST-STAGE
worker 2
C S
worker 1 C X1 − c1/2,X2 − c2/2 Y1, 0
S 0,Y2 X1,X2
worker discounts his future payoff and reflects the patience of
him. Taking into account imperfect monitoring, the outcome
of the task received by the requester is inconsistent with the
effort of the worker. Let ε1 and ε2 denote the probabilities that
monitoring or reporting errors occur in the first stage and the
second stage, respectively. In short, there exist eight intrinsic
parameters in a crowdsourcing contest dilemma game, namely
c1, c2, s1, s2, d, δ, ε1 and ε2. We summarize these parameters
as well as other notations used in the paper in Table I.
In the above proposed model, workers’ heterogeneity (i.e.,
workers costs and abilities are different) is taken into consider-
ation, which is the only difference from our previous one [6].
This makes our model more close to reality. The entire pay-
off matrix for the revised game played in the first stage was
depicted in Table II, where we set Xi = 1/2−sid+(sid2)/2,
Yi = [d−(ci+d)2/2](1−ci−si)+(1−ci−d)2(1−ci)/2). The
concrete computation process for Table II is given in Appendix
A.
In the resulting equilibrium, for any choice of intrinsic
parameters, only CC and SS can be pure strategy equilibria in
the first stage, and malicious behavior is the normal, not the
abnormal, i.e., the expected number of attacks is one regardless
of any choice of intrinsic parameters, which is contrary to
the conventional wisdom in the area. In other words, workers
find enticement to free-ride and attack in their self-interest, an
inefficient outcome arises for such a myopic equilibrium.
B. Rating Protocol
In order to overcome the inefficiency of the socially unde-
sirable equilibrium by extorting selfish workers and enforcing
cooperation among them, i.e., taking the requesters’ point of
view and trying to maximize their average utilities on all
tasks, while provide sufficient incentives to compel rational
and selfish individuals to contribute good behaviors in tasks,
we devote with rating protocol to incentivize self-interested
workers to comply with the social norm, and thus evade
the myopic equilibrium. In this paper, we integrate binary
rating labels with differential pricing to incentivize workers
to contribute good behaviors. In order to provide enough
incentives by transferring payoffs from low-rating workers
to high-rating workers, we use differential punishments that
punish workers with different ratings differently. The proposed
rating protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 1: A rating protocol P is defined as the rules that
a crowdsourcing platform uses to regulate the behavior of his
workers, and is represented as a quadruple (Θ, σ, τ, ψ), i.e.,
a set of binary rating labels Θ, a social strategy σ, a rating
scheme τ , and a pricing scheme ψ.
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the proposed rating protocol P
• Θ = {0, 1} denotes the set of binary rating labels, where
1 is the good rating and 0 is the bad rating.
• σ : Θ → A represents the adopted social strategy for
a worker with rating label θ, where σ(θ|θ ∈ Θ) ∈
{CN,CA, SN, SA}.
• τ : Θ × A → ∆(Θ) specifies how a worker’s rating
should be updated based on his adopted strategies and
current rating as follows:
τ(θ′|θ, σ(θ)) =

1, if θ′ = 1, θ = 1
and σ(θ) = CN
α, if θ′ = 1, θ = 0
and σ(θ) = CN
1− α, if θ′ = 0, θ = 0
and σ(θ) = CN
1, if θ′ = 0, θ = 0
and σ(θ) 6= CN
β, if θ′ = 0, θ = 1
and σ(θ) 6= CN
1− β, if θ′ = 1, θ = 1
and σ(θ) 6= CN
(1)
• ψ : Θ → R defines the rules that rewarding/punishing
workers by implementing differential prices for the con-
tributions according to the rating of workers:
ψ(θ) = γθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ (2)
where γ0 is the minimal price, γ1 is the maximal price.
Remark: A schematic representation of a rating scheme τ
based on Definition 1 is provided in Figure 1. Under the rating
update rule, if the social strategy adopted by a worker with
rating 0 is observed to be CN (i.e., the worker chooses C
in the first stage game and chooses N in the second stage
game.), his rating will increase to 1 with probability α, and
hold rating 0 with probability 1 − α; otherwise, if the social
strategy adopted by a worker with rating 0 is not CN, he will
hold rating 0 with probability 1. The analysis for the scenario
of a worker with rating 1 follows in a similar manner. Hence,
α can be referred to as the strength of reward imposed on
workers when they contribute good behaviors, while β can be
referred to as the strength of punishment imposed on workers
when they do not follow the recommended strategies. Other
more elaborated rating update rules may be considered, but
we will show that this simple one is good enough to enforce
cooperation among self-interested workers, and maximizes the
social utility of the requester. In order to enforce incentives
on service provision, the protocol designer assigns workers
5with high rating higher payment as reward and hence, workers
are encouraged to contribute good behaviors to increase their
ratings for a return of higher payment. To determine the range
of feasible prices γ0 and γ1, we assume that the maximum
benefit which a requester obtains from receiving one unit of
service is 1. It is obvious that the feasible prices should be
restricted to 0 ≤ γ0 < γ1 ≤ 1.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Stationary Rating Distribution
Given a rating protocol P , suppose that each worker
always follows the given recommended strategy σP(θ) =
CN,∀θ ∈ Θ, who is called as a “compliant worker”, where
the worker who deviates from social norm and plays σ′(θ) ∈
{CA,SA, SN} is called as a “non-compliant worker”. As
time passes, the ratings of compliant workers are updated,
hence the distribution of ratings in a crowdsourcing plat-
form evolves as a Markov chain, whose transition proba-
bility pP(θ′|θ) is determined by the recommended strategy
employed by workers. Since we are interested in the long term
utilities of workers, we study the rating distribution in the long
run when all workers follow the given recommended strategy
CN . Let {ηtP(θ)|θ ∈ Θ} be the fraction of θ-workers (i.e.,
a worker with rating θ is denoted by θ-worker) in the total
population at the beginning of an arbitrary period t, then the
transition from {ηtP(θ)}1θ=0 to {ηt+1P (θ)}1θ=0 is determined by
the rating scheme τ , as shown in Eq. (3).
ηt+1P (0) = pP(0|1, σ(1) = CN)ηtP(1)
+pP (0|0, σ(0) = CN)ηtP(0)
ηt+1P (1) = pP(1|1, σ(1) = CN)ηtP(1)
+pP (1|0, σ(0) = CN)ηtP(0)
(3)
Where pP(θ′|θ, σ(θ)) denotes the transition probability that a
θ-worker from the current period becomes a θ′-worker in the
next period under the rating protocol P when the worker’s
action is σ(θ), which can be expressed as
pP(θ′|θ, σ(θ)) =
1− β(ε1 + ε2 − ε1ε2), if σ(θ) = CN,
θ = 1 and θ′ = 1
β(ε1 + ε2 − ε1ε2), if σ(θ) = CN,
θ = 1 and θ′ = 0
α(1− ε1 − ε2 + ε1ε2), if σ(θ) = CN,
θ = 0 and θ′ = 1
1− α(1− ε1 − ε2 + ε1ε2), if σ(θ) = CN,
θ = 0 and θ′ = 0
1− β(1− ε2 + ε1ε2), if σ(θ) = CA,
θ = 1 and θ′ = 1
β(1− ε2 + ε1ε2), if σ(θ) = CA,
θ = 1 and θ′ = 0
α(ε2 − ε1ε2), if σ(θ) = CA,
θ = 0 and θ′ = 1
1− α(ε2 − ε1ε2), if σ(θ) = CA,
θ = 0 and θ′ = 0
(4)
As
∑1
θ=0 ηP(θ) = 1, with simple manipulations, there
exists a unique stationary rating distribution {ηtP(θ)}, which
is derived as follows:{
ηP(0) =
β(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)
β(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)+α(1−ε1−ε2+ε1ε2)
ηP(1) =
α(1−ε1−ε2+ε1ε2)
β(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)+α(1−ε1−ε2+ε1ε2)
(5)
B. Sustainable Conditions
Given a fixed pricing scheme ψ under the rating protocol P ,
the expected one-period utility of a worker is only determined
by his adopted strategy as well as his current rating label,
which can be expressed as follows:
vP(θ|α) =

vCN (γ1), if θ = 1 and σ(θ) = CN
vCN (γ0), if θ = 0 and σ(θ) = CN
vCA(γ1), if θ = 1 and σ(θ) = CA
vCA(γ0), if θ = 0 and σ(θ) = CA
(6)
Where the expected payoff associated with actions CN and CA
under monitoring or reporting errors can be found according
to Eq.(38) in Appendix B. Since a non-compliant worker
may benefit by unilaterally deviating from the recommended
strategy CN, and myopically choosing strategies CA, SA or SN,
then his expected payoff has its maximal value when it chooses
strategy CA with probability 1, i.e., a worker’s optimal strategy
choice is binary regardless of his current rating label: either CN
or CA, and hence there is no need to consider the remaining
two strategies SA and SN that a non-compliant worker may
choose.
The expected long-term utility of a θ-worker is the infinite-
horizon discounted sum of his expected one-period utility with
his expected future payoff multiplied by a common discount
factor δ, which can be computed by solving the following
recursive equation
v∞P (θ|σ(θ)) = vP(θ|σ(θ))+δ
∑
θ′∈Θ
pP(θ′|θ, σ(θ))v∞P (θ′|σ(θ))
(7)
Where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the rate at which a worker discounts his
future payoff, and reflects his patience. It is obvious that a
more patient worker has a larger discount factor.
According to the self-interested strategic nature of workers,
they are willing to comply with the recommended strategy σ,
if and only if they find it advantageous to their self-interest,
i.e., they cannot be benefitted with respect to their expected
long-term utility upon deviations given the deployed rating
protocol P . Such a rating protocol is called a sustainable rating
protocol, and the sustainability of it is correspondingly defined
as follows:
Definition 2: A rating protocol P is sustainable if the opti-
mal social strategy for a θ-worker is σ∗P(θ) = CN, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
When a θ-worker follows the recommend strategy σP(θ) =
CN under the rating protocol P , he receives expected long-
term utility v∞P (θ|σP(θ)). On the contrary, he will receive
expected long-term utility v∞P (θ|σ′P(θ)) when he deviates
from the recommended strategy CN to CA. By comparing
these two payoffs, we can derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for a rating protocol to be sustainable, as shown
in Proposition 1.
6Proposition 1: A rating protocol P is sustainable if and only
if
v∞P (1|σ∗)− v∞P (0|σ∗) ≥
max
{[
vCA(γ0)− vCN (γ0)
]
/α, [vCA(γ1)− vCN (γ1)]/β
}
δ(1− ε1 − 2ε2 + 2ε1ε2)
(8)
Proof: For the “if” part: Given a sustainable rating
protocol P , a θ-worker will comply with the optimal social
strategy with σ∗P(0) = σ
∗
P(1) = CN , his expected long-term
utilities can be expressed as follows:
v∞P (0|σ∗) = vCN (γ0) + δ
[
pP(1|0, σ∗)v∞P (1|σ∗)+
pP(0|0, σ∗)v∞P (0|σ∗)
] (9)
v∞P (1|σ∗) = vCN (γ1) + δ
[
pP(1|1, σ∗)v∞P (1|σ∗)+
pP(0|1, σ∗)v∞P (0|σ∗)
] (10)
By comparing (9) and (10), we have
v∞P (1|σ∗)− v∞P (0|σ∗) =
vCN (γ1)− vCN (γ0)
1− δ[1− β(ε1 + ε2 − ε1ε2)− α(1− ε1 − ε2 + ε1ε2)]
(11)
According to the one-shot deviation principle [39], the ex-
pected long term utility of a worker with rating 0 unilaterally
deviating from σ∗ to σ′ only in the current period and
following σ∗ afterwards, which can be computed by solving
v∞P (0|σ′) = vCA(γ0) + δ
[
pP(1|0, σ′(0) = CA)v∞P (1|σ∗)+
pP(0|0, σ′(0) = CA)v∞P (0|σ∗)
]
(12)
Similarly, the expected long-term utility of a deviating worker
with rating 1 is given by
v∞P (1|σ′) = vCA(γ1) + δ
[
pP(1|1, σ′(1) = CA)v∞P (1|σ∗)+
pP(0|1, σ′(1) = CA)v∞P (0|σ∗)
]
(13)
By solving inequalities (14) and (15)
v∞P (0|σ∗) ≥ v∞P (0|σ′) (14)
v∞P (1|σ∗) ≥ v∞P (1|σ′) (15)
we can obtain the following inequality by substituting (9) into
the LHS of (14), and substituting (12) into RHS of (14).
v∞P (1|σ∗)− v∞P (0|σ∗) ≥
vCA(γ0)− vCN (γ0)
δα(1− ε1 − 2ε2 + 2ε1ε2) (16)
Similarly, the following inequality can be derived by substitut-
ing (10) into the LHS of (15), and substituting (13) into RHS
of (15).
v∞P (1|σ∗)− v∞P (0|σ∗) ≥
vCA(γ1)− vCN (γ1)
δβ(1− ε1 − 2ε2 + 2ε1ε2) (17)
Hence, inequality (8) can be hold by combing inequalities (16)
and (17).
For the “only if” part: Suppose that inequality (8) is satisfied
under the rating protocol P , we can obtain v∞P (0|σ∗) ≥
v∞P (0|σ) and v∞P (1|σ∗) ≥ v∞P (1|σ) for any σ. With this in
mind, we can derive the range for these design parameters
(i.e., α, β, γ1 and γ0) in (8), and thus design a rating protocol
under which sustains the incentive for workers to comply with
the recommended strategies. Hence, this proposition follows.
C. Rating Protocol Design with Constraints
Given a sustainable rating protocol P , each worker always
chooses to devote a high level of effort in the first stage and
does not attack his opponent in the second stage, hence, the
requester’s utility will be only determined by the payment
that he rewards the winner, which is γ1 to the winner having
rating 1, and γ0 to the winner having rating 0. Let uθP denote
the expected one-period utility of the requester in the case
that the winner has rating θ, taking into account monitoring
or reporting errors ε1 and ε2. The expression of uθP can be
derived as follows:
uθP = (1−ε1−ε2+ε1ε2)(1−γθ)+(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)(−γθ) (18)
Where 1 − γθ is the utility of the requester when he reports
that his task has been fulfilled, which happens with probability
1− ε1− ε2 + ε1ε2. When the task has not been accomplished,
which happens with probability ε1 + ε2 − ε1ε2, the utility of
the requester is −γθ, i.e., the request suffers a payment γθ,
and receives no benefit.
In a two-stage game of a crowdsourcing competition, the
worker who has a higher productivity at the end of the second
stage wins reward γθ, whose value is determined by the
winner’s rating label θ. Let (θ, θ˜) denote a focal worker with
rating θ competing against his opponent worker with rating θ˜,
to win the reward. There are 4 possible combinations for (θ, θ˜)
namely (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1). The computation process
for the social utility of the requester in these four cases is as
follows:
uP(θ, θ˜) = η(θ)η(θ0)(
1
2
uθP +
1
2
uθ˜P)
=

η(0)η(0)u0P , if θ = θ˜ = 0
1
2η(0)η(1)(u
0
P + u
1
P), if θ = 0 and θ˜ = 1
1
2η(0)η(1)(u
0
P + u
1
P), if θ = 1 and θ˜ = 0
η(1)η(1)u1P , if θ = θ˜ = 1
(19)
η(θ)η(θ0) is the probability that the focal worker with a
rating θ competes against the opponent worker whose rating
is θ˜. When both of the focal worker and his opponent worker
comply with the recommended strategy, each one is equally
likely to win the reward, and the expected probability for
each one to be the winner is 1/2. Given a sustainable rating
protocol P , strategic workers will find enticement to follow the
recommended strategy in their self-interest regardless of their
ratings even under the imperfect monitoring, and which worker
wins the game depends only on the strategies adopted by both
workers, hence, the probability of becoming the winner is
independent of the workers’ ratings and thus each worker has
the same probability of becoming the winner.
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Ki1 =
(1−ε1−2ε2+2ε1ε2)
[
viCN (γ1)−viCN (0)
]
−(1−ε1−ε2+ε1ε2)
[
viCA(0)−viCN (0)
]
(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)
[
viCA(0)−viCN (0)
]
Bi1 = − 1−δδ(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)
Ki2 =
(1−ε1−ε2+ε1ε2)
[
viCA(γ1)−viCN (γ1)
]
(1−ε1−2ε2+2ε1ε2)
[
viCN (γ1)−viCN (0)
]
−(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)
[
viCA(γ1)−viCN (γ1)
]
Bi2 =
(1−δ)
[
viCA(γ1)−viCN (γ1)
]
δ(1−ε1−2ε2+2ε1ε2)
[
viCN (γ1)−viCN (0)
]
−δ(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)
[
viCA(γ1)−viCN (γ1)
]
Ki3 = − (1−ε1−ε2+ε1ε2)v
i
CN (γ1)
(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)viCN (0)
Bi3 =
δ−1
δ(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)
K4 =
(1−ε1−ε2+ε1ε2)
[
(1−ε1−ε2+ε1ε2)−γ1−UP
]
(ε1+ε2−ε1ε2)
[
UP−(1−ε1−ε2+ε1ε2)
]
(23)
Let UP denote the social utility under the sustainable
protocol P , which can be formulated as follows:
UP =
1∑
θ=0
1∑
θ˜=0
uP(θ, θ˜) (20)
Eq.(20) can be rewritten as follows by substituy Eq.(19) to
it:
UP =(1− ε1 − ε2 + ε1ε2)−
βγ0(ε1 + ε2 − ε1ε2) + αγ1(1− ε1 − ε2 + ε1ε2)
β(ε1 + ε2 − ε1ε2) + α(1− ε1 − ε2 + ε1ε2)
(21)
We assume that the protocol designer is profit-seeking and
aims to design a sustainable rating protocol P that maximizes
the requester’s expected one-period utility, which is the benefit
per period of a requester, deducts the payment reward to
workers. In order to attract workers to stay in the platform for a
long period of time, additional incentive constraints are needed
to prevent the long period utility of a worker to be negative,
regardless of his current rating label. Given this, the problem
of designing a rating protocol can be formally expressed as:
Definition 3: The rating protocol design problem is formu-
lated as follows:
max
(α,β,γ1,γ0)
UP ,
∑1
θ=0
∑1
θ˜=0 uP(θ, θ˜)
s.t.
{
σ∗P(θ) = CN, ∀θ ∈ Θ
u∞P (θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ
(22)
IV. OPTIMAL DESIGN OF RATING PROTOCOLS
In this section we investigate the design of an optimal rating
protocol that solves the design problem of Eq. (22), i.e., select-
ing the optimal rating scheme τ and optimal pricing scheme ψ,
which are determined by four design parameters (α, β, γ1, γ0).
In order to characterize an optimal design, which is denoted
as (α∗, β∗, γ∗1 , γ
∗
0 ), we investigate the impacts of four design
parameters on the social welfare UP =
∑1
θ=0
∑1
θ˜=0 uP(θ, θ˜),
and the incentive for satisfying constraints in Eq. (22).
A. Constraints in the Optimal Design Problem
In order to maximize the social utility, the requester wants
to pay his workers as little as possible, on the premise of sup-
porting enough incentive for workers to follow the recommend
strategy CN, and stay in the system for a long period. The
above observations are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: γ∗0 = 0 is always an optimal solution to (22).
Proof: Given α, β and γ1, the social utility monotonically
decreases with γ0, which is maximized when γ0 = 0. Let us
assume that a worker deviates from the social norm, his rating
will be decreased to 0 with a large probability, and he will
receive the reward γ0 as a punishment. Hence, the worker’s
incentive is also maximized when γ0 = 0. Therefore, this
statement follows.
In the remainder of our design, we set γ0 = 0 by default
without further notice. Given a fixed γ1, variables Ki1, B
i
1, K
i
2,
Bi2, K
i
3, B
i
3 and K4 are defined in Eq. (23) for convenience.
Proposition 2: Given a fixed γ1, constraints in the rating
protocol design problem (22) for ith-worker are satisfied if
and only if β ∈ [Ki2α+Bi2,Ki3α+Bi3].
Proof: For the “if” part: Given a fixed γ1, we assume
that each constraint in the rating protocol design problem (22)
are satisfied, there are two constraints that need to be fulfilled
simultaneously for the ith-worker.
Firstly, we need to satisfy the one-shot deviation principle,
and thus have the lower bound of β by substituting (11) into
(8), i.e., β ∈ [max{Ki1α + Bi1,Ki2α + Bi2}, 1]. If the ith-
worker holds rating 0, then his expected one-period utility
viP(γ
∗
0) < 0, this is because the ith-worker will receive no
reward but consume ci by choosing C in the first stage. The
expected one-period utility of a worker with rating 0 whose
adopted strategy is CA will loss more than the worker with
rating 0 whose adopted strategy is CN, because the former
one consumes ci in the first stage, and si in the second stage,
but the latter one only consumes ci in the first stage, i.e.,
viCA(0) < v
i
CN (0) < 0. Therefore, we have K
i
1 < 0, B
i
1 < 0
and β ≥ Ki1α+Bi1 regardless of any choice of α and β, we
thus have β ∈ [Ki2α+Bi2, 1].
Secondly, in order to make sure that workers have sufficient
incentive to contribute good behaviors, we must hold both
v∞P (0) ≥ 0 and v∞P (1) ≥ 0. Since the worker with rating 1
will obtain reward γ1, which is higher than the worker with
rating 0 whose reward is γ0. We thus only have to make sure
that the long-term utility of the worker with rating zero must
be non-negative which corresponds to the upper bound of β
by substituting (11) into (9), i.e., β ∈ [0,Ki3α + Bi3]. Hence,
this statement follows.
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

((1-B3)/K3,1)
Feasible domain
(1,1)
(a) Case i: β∗ = 1 ∧K2 < 0
(0,0)


((1-B2)/K2,1)((1-B3)/K3,1)
(1,1)
Feasible domain
(b) Case ii: β∗ = 1 ∧K2 > 0
(0,0)


(1,1)
(1,K3+B3)
Feasible domain
(c) Case iii: α∗ = 1 ∧K2 < 0
(0,0)


(1,1)
(1,K3+B3)
Feasible domain
(1,K2+B2)
(d) Case iv: α∗ = 1 ∧K2 > 0
Figure 2. Illustration of how to build the feasible domain for (α, β): According to the possible optimal solution for α and β, as well as the range of γ1,
we divide such a problem into four cases, the closed region in each case is a feasible solution of (α, β) for a fixed γ1, and the red point denotes the optimal
solution (α∗, β∗).
For the “only if” part, we assume that β ∈ [Ki2α +
Bi2,K
i
3α+B
i
3], it is easy to determine that constraints in the
rating protocol design problem (22) are satisfied, and hence
the “only if” part can be proved, which is omitted here.
Proposition 3: Given a fixed γ1, we have
(i) β = K4α;
(ii) Social utility monotonically increases with K4.
Proof: (i) β = K4α is directly converted from (21), in
which we treat K4 as a constant and β as a function with
variable α.
(ii) The partial derivative UP with respect to K4 can be
derived as follows.
∂UP
∂K4
=
(ε1 + ε2 − ε1ε2)
[
UP − (1− ε1 − ε2 + ε2ε2)
]2
(1− ε1 − ε2 + ε1ε2)γ1
(24)
It is obvious that the value of (24) is positive, hence the
statement (ii) follows.
B. Optimal Value of the Design Problem
We now focus on the optimal value of the remaining three
design parameters α, β and γ1. As shown in the proof of
Proposition 2, there exist two constraints that need to be
fulfilled simultaneously for the ith-worker. Similary, there exist
another two constraints for the jth-worker, and hence we have
β ∈ [max{Ki2α+Bi2,Kj2α+Bj2},min{Ki3α+Bi3,Kj3α+Bj3}]
In the following, we design a rating protocol that achieves
the social optimum at the equilibrium under the conditions
that all of these four constraints hold. We assume that γ1 is
fixed, the four constraints constitute a convex set Q, i.e., if
and only if (α, β) ∈ Q, the two constraints in Proposition 2
will be satisfied simultaneously. Since the feasible domain of
(α, β) is a convex set, the optimal solution (α∗, β∗) must be
at the boundary of the feasible domain, i.e., α∗ = 1 or β∗ = 1,
thereby we find the local optimum in two cases and then find
a global optimum from such two cases.
Theorem 2: The output (α∗, β∗, γ∗1 ) derived by Algorithm
1 is an optimal solution of (22).
Proof: Algorithm 1 takes c1, c2, s1, s2, ε1, ε2, d and
δ as input and returns (α∗, β∗, γ∗1 ). It consists of 3 parts:
Part 1 (line 1-4) determines the constrained parameters, i.e.,
K2, B2, K3, and B3; Part 2 (line 5-16) determines whether
Algorithm 1 Optimal Design of Rating Protocol
Input: c1, c2, s1, s2, ε1, ε2, d and δ;
Output: α∗, β∗, γ∗1 ;
1: K2 = maxi∈{1,2}Ki3;
2: B2 = B
argi∈{1,2} maxK
i
2
2 ;
3: K3 = mini∈{1,2}Ki3;
4: B3 = B
argi∈{1,2} minK
i
3
3 ;
5: if γ1 ∈ [γ1,1, γ1,1] satisfies ( 1−B3K3 < 1) ∩
{
(K2 < 0) ∪[
(K2 > 0) ∩ ( 1−B2K2 > 1−B3K3 )
]}
then
6: α∗1 =
1−B3
K3
7: β∗1 = 1
8: γ∗1,1 = γ1,1
9: Compute U1P(α
∗
1, β
∗
1 , γ
∗
1,1)
10: end if
11: if γ2 ∈ [γ1,2, γ1,2] satisfies γ1 in (K3+B3 ≤ 1)∩
{
(K2 <
0) ∪ [(K2 > 0) ∩ (K2 +B2 ≤ K3 +B3)]} then
12: α∗2 = 1
13: β∗2 = K3 +B3
14: γ∗1,2 = γ1,2
15: Compute U2P(α
∗
2, β
∗
2 , γ
∗
1,2)
16: end if
17: t = arg
i∈{1,2}
max UP,i
18: α∗ = α∗t
19: β∗ = β∗t
20: γ∗1 = γ
∗
1,t
there exists a feasible solution with the remaining three design
parameters satisfying constraints in (22). If it is true, then we
obtain a partial optimal solution; Part 3 (line 17-20) returns
the global optimal solution (α∗, β∗, γ∗1) according to all the
local optimal solutions we have found. The computational
complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(mn2), where m and n
represent the reciprocal of accumulation unit for determining
γ∗1 and the number of iterations for computing the expected
long-term utility in (7), respectively. The detailed explanation
of this algorithm is as follows:
Part 1 (line 1-4): According to (23), it is easy to determine
that Bi2 > B
j
2 if K
i
2 > K
j
i , and we thus have β ≥ Ki2α +
9Bi2 > K
j
2α+B
j
2. If we require that these two constraints hold
simultaneously, we only need to make sure β ≥ Ki2α+Bi2, as
shown in line 1 and 2. Similarly, β ≤ Kj3α+Bj3 < Ki3α+Bi3
if Ki3 > K
j
3 , we then only need to make sure β ≤ Kj3α+Bj3,
as shown in line 3 and 4.
Part 2 (line 5-16): It is obvious that the feasible set Q formed
by constraints β ∈ [K2α+B2,K3α+B3]∩[0, 1] and α ∈ [0, 1]
is a convex set, and hence the optimal values of α and β must
at the endpoint. According to (23), it is easy to determine that
Ki3 > 0, B
i
3 < 0, and both K
i
2 and B
i
2 are positive or negative.
According to Proposition 3, β = K4α and the social utility
monotonically increases with K4. Therefore, we obtain two
possible solutions that either α∗ = 1 or β∗ = 1, and divide it
into four cases as shown in Figure 2 by graphical method for
the linear programming problem.
Case i and ii (line 5-10): The feasible domain of (α, β) is
illustrated as shown in Figure 2(a) and 2(b) when β∗ = 1.
We assume that β∗1 = 1 ∧ K2 < 0 for Case i, and have
B2 < 0 according to (23). Therefore, it is easy to determine
that β ≥ K2α+ B2,∀α, β ∈ [0, 1] holds. Moreover, we need
to make sure that 1−B3K3 < 1 holds for {β ≤ K3α + B3} ∧{β∗1 = 1}. In Case ii as shown in Figure 2(b), we assume
that β∗1 = 1 ∧K2 > 0, and ensure to hold 1−B2K2 > 1−B3K3 for
β ∈ [K2α+B2,K3α+B3]. As the social utility increases as
the slope increases, (α∗1, β
∗
1) = (
1−B3
K3 , 1) is directly derived.
Let γ1,1 and γ1,1 denote the smallest and largest value of γ1,1
(i.e., the value of γ1,1 when β∗ = 1 is fixed), respectively, such
that Q1 = ( 1−B3K3 < 1) ∩ {(K2 < 0) ∪ [(K2 > 0) ∩ ( 1−B2K2 >
1−B3
K3
)]} holds. Since the social utility decreases with γ1,1,
hence γ∗1,1 = γ1,1. The expression of the social utility under
the condition that (α∗1, β
∗
1) = (
1−B3
K3
, 1) holds is as follows
(where we set Z = 1− ε1 − ε2 + ε1ε2):
U1P(α
∗
1, β
∗
1 , γ1) = Z−
γ1(1− δZ)vCN (γ0)
(1− δ)vCN (γ0) + δ(ε1 + ε2 − ε1ε2)
[
vCN (γ0)− vCN (γ1)
]
(25)
Case iii and iv (line 11-16): The feasible domain of (α, β)
is illustrated as shown in Figure 2(c) and 2(d) when α∗ = 1.
We assume that K2 < 0 ∧ α∗ = 1 for Case iii, which is
similar with Case i, we only need to ensure K3 + B3 ≤ 1
holds for {β ≤ K3α+B3} ∧ {α∗1 = 1}. In Case iv as shown
in Figure 2(d), we assume that K2 > 0 ∧ α∗ = 1, and need
to make sure that {K3 + B3 ≤ 1} ∧ {K2 + B2 ≤ K3 + B3}
holds for {β ∈ [K2α+B2,K3α+B3]}∧{α∗ = 1}. Since the
social utility monotonically increases as the slope increases,
we then have (α∗1, β
∗
1) = (1,K3 + B3). Let γ1,2 and γ1,2
denote the smallest and largest value of γ1 when α∗ = 1 is
fixed, respectively, such that Q2 = (K3 +B3 ≤ 1) ∩ {(K2 <
0)∪ [(K2 > 0)∩ (K2 +B2 ≤ K3 +B3)]} holds. As the social
utility increases with γ1,2 when (α∗1, β
∗
1) = (1,K3 + B3),
we thus have γ∗1,2 = γ1,2. The expression of the social utility
under the condition that (α∗1, β
∗
1) = (1,K3+B3) is as follows:
U2P(α
∗
2, β
∗
2 , γ1) = Z−
δγ1ZvCN (γ0)
(δ − 1)vCN (γ0) + δZ
[
vCN (γ0)− vCN (γ1)
] (26)
In summary, all possible values of α, β and γ are covered
by the above four cases, and hence max{U1P , U2P} returns the
optimal value of the social utility under the proposed rating
protocol P .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to illustrate
the key features of the designed optimal rating protocol for
the crowdsourcing contest dilemma. Firstly, we show how
intrinsic parameters impact on design parameters. Secondly,
we show how the performance gain of the proposed rating
protocol changes when intrinsic parameters vary, especially
under heterogeneity of workers. To solve problem (22) of
social welfare maximization, we first fix γ∗0 = 0 regardless
of any choice of intrinsic parameters, and then select α∗, β∗
and γ∗1 based on Algorithm 1.
A. The Impact of Intrinsic Parameters on Design Parameters
In the first experiment, we illustrate how the optimal design
(α∗, β∗, γ∗1 ) is influenced by intrinsic parameters: (a) c1, (b)
c2, (c) s1, (d) s2, (e) d, (f) δ, (g) ε1 and (h) ε2 in Figure 3. The
line chart plots the optimal value of (α∗, β∗, γ∗1) in the optimal
design rating protocol. In the remainder of this section, we set
s1 = 0.2, c2 = 0.2, s2 = 0.1, d = 0.5, δ = 0.95, ε1 = 0.2 and
ε2 = 0.05 by default without further notice.
Figure 3(a) illustrates the impact of c1 on (α∗, β∗, γ∗1 ).
As shown by the results in Figure 3(a), γ∗1 increases as c1
increases when c1 > c2. The major reason is that we only
have to make sure worker 2 has enough incentive to comply
with the recommend strategy as he has more desire to deviate
c1 < c2. Besides, a compliant worker’s expected one-period
utility monotonically decreases with c1, and hence we have to
increase the strength of incentive by increasing γ1 to incentive
workers to always behave well even with a large c1. A similar
phenomenon can be observed in Figure 3(b), γ∗1 increases as
c1 increases when c2 > c1.
Different from Figure 3(a) and 3(b), γ∗1 remains unchanged
as s1 increases in Figure 3(c). This is due to the fact that
c1 < c2 and thus worker 2 prefers to deviate from the
recommend strategy, if we ensure worker 2 abide by the
recommend strategy, worker 1 certainly will not deviate even
s1 increases. However, in Figure 3(d), γ∗1 increases as s2
increases. This is because increasing the cost s2 reduces the
gap between v∞P (CA) and v
∞
P (CN), thereby leading to a
reduced punishment on workers and we have to increase
the strength of reward to incentive workers conform to the
recommend strategy.
Similar to Figure 3(c), as d increases, the γ∗1 keeps the same
as shown in Figure 3(e). The reason behind this phenomenon
is the same. Figure 3(f) illustrates the impact of δ on design
parameters. As δ increases, a worker puts a higher weight on
his future utility relative to his instant utility, and hence, it is
easy to give incentive to workers to comply with the social
norm, thereby leading to a lower punishment (decreased γ∗1 )
upon workers, and an increased optimal social welfare when
workers have more patience. Figure 3(g) and 3(h) show that γ∗1
increases as ε1 (or ε2) when ε2 (or ε1) is fixed, respectively.
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Figure 3. Design parameters versus intrinsic parameters: (a) c1; (b) c2; (c) s1; (d) s2; (e) d; (f) δ; (g) ε1; (h) ε2.
The reason is that the increase of ε1 or ε2 will cause a worker
who comply with recommend strategy be mistakenly identified
as a deviating worker, hence decreases his utility. Thereby we
need a higher strength of incentive by increasing γ∗1 . Besides,
the impact of ε2 on γ1 is greater than ε1. This is due to the
monitoring error happened in the second stage will caused
more costs than monitoring error happened in the first stage.
According to Figure 3 we can find that different γ∗1 will cause
different α∗ and β∗ and this is corresponding to our theoretical
result.
B. Experiments on Optimal Social Utility Against Intrinsic
Parameters
In the second experiment, we examine the optimal social
utility UP against intrinsic parameters c1, c2, s1, s2, d, δ, ε1
and ε2. The optimal value of social utility takes the maximum
of these four cases (i.e., Cases i, ii, iii and iv).
As shown by the results in Figure 4(a), the social utility
UP decreases as c1 increases when c1 > c2. A similar
phenomenon can be found in Figure 4(b) that UP decreases as
c2 increases when c2 > c1. This is because we need to increase
the strength of incentive by increasing γ∗1 as c1, c2 and d
increase to prevent the focal worker from deviating, if the cost
of the focal worker in the fist stage greater than the opponent
worker’s. Different from Figure 4(a) and 4(b), UP remains
unchanged as s1 increases as shown in Figure 4(c). The reason
behind this phenomenon is the same as that of Figure 3(c),
the requester does not need to increase reward to rase the
strength of incentive when c1 < c2. However, UP increases as
s2 increases as shown in Figure 4(d), this is due to the fact that
we need to increase the reward as s2 increases, and hence the
social utility decreases. In Figure 4(e), the social utility UP
remain unchanged as d increases. This is because that workers
will not deviate even d increase since the exists of incentive
mechanism. In Figure 4(f), the social utility UP increases as δ
increases. It is easy to give a worker with a higher δ incentive
to follow the recommended strategies, thereby we can decrease
γ∗1 properly to receive higher social utility as δ increases. As
shown in Figure 4(g) and 4(h), the social utility decreases as
ε1 and ε2 increase. The main reason is the same as shown in
Figure 3(g) and 3(h), since γ∗1 increases as ε1 and ε2 increase,
hence, the social utility will be decreased.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we developed a novel game-theoretic design of
rating protocols that integrated binary rating labels with differ-
ential pricing to address the crowdsourcing contest dilemma.
In particular, we stood at the requester’s point of view, and
studied strategies for requesters to successfully maximize their
utilities by extorting selfish workers and enforcing cooperation
among them. By rigorously analyzing how workers’ behaviors
are influenced by intrinsic parameters, design parameters,
as well as workers’ evaluation of their individual long-term
utilities, we characterize the optimal design by selecting four
optimal design parameters (α∗, β∗, γ∗1 , γ
∗
0), which are related
to differential punishments and pricing schemes. Under the
designed optimal rating protocol, requesters pay their workers
as little as possible while enforcing sufficient incentives for
individual workers to follow the social norm, even in the
presence of imperfect monitoring.
In the future research, we intend to extend this work
in several directions. Firstly, it is interesting to consider a
large number of non-long-lived individuals in a crowdsourcing
platform and aim to maximize the social welfare (i.e., the sum
utility) of both workers and requesters. Secondly, we assume in
this paper that each individual in the crowdsourcing platform
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Figure 4. Social utility against intrinsic parameters: (a) c1; (b) c2; (c) s1; (d) s2; (e) d; (f) δ; (g) ε1; (h) ε2.
Table III
THE PAY-OFF MATRIX OF EACH WORKER FOR THE SECOND-STAGE GAME
UNDER THE (C,C) CASE
worker 2
A N
worker 1 A 1− c1 − s1,−c2 − s2 1− c1 − s1,−c2
N −c1, 1− c2 − s2 1− c1,−c2
has two roles, one as a requester and the other as a worker,
and the role of an individual can not be switched in the next
period. It is interesting to design appropriate rating protocols
not following this assumption. Thirdly, we have assumed that
individuals are entirely rational in crowdsourcing platform,
however this assumption does not always hold in practice, and
hence using real data to check the validity of proposed rating
protocol is a next step for our future work.
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APPENDIX
A. The Computation Process for Table II
The concrete computation process for Table II in four cases
is shown as follows:
Case I: (C,C), i.e., both workers choose C. The pay-off
matrix showing utilities for Case (C,C) appears in Table III.
Let p1 and p2 denote productivities of worker 1 and worker 2,
Table IV
THE PAY-OFF MATRIX OF EACH WORKER FOR THE SECOND-STAGE GAME
UNDER THE (S,S) CASE
worker 2
A N
worker 1 A 1− s1,−s2 1− s1, 0
N 0, 1− s2 1, 0
Table V
THE PAY-OFF MATRIX OF EACH WORKER FOR THE SECOND-STAGE GAME
UNDER THE (C,S) CASE
worker 2
A N
worker 1 A 1− c1 − s1,−s2 1− c1 − s1, 0
N 1− c1 − d,−(s2 + d)(1− s2) 1− c1, 0
respectively, which are known before they decide on attacking.
The ex-ante utility of worker 1 is
v1 =Pr(p2 < p1 < p2 + d)(1− c1 − s1)+
Pr(p1 > p2 + d)(1− c1)
=1/2− c1/2− s1d+ (s1d2)/2
(27)
Table VI
THE PAY-OFF MATRIX OF EACH WORKER FOR THE SECOND-STAGE GAME
UNDER THE (S,C) CASE
worker 2
A N
worker 1 A −s1, 1− c2 − s2 0, 1− c2 − s2
N −(s1 + d)(1− s1), 1− c2 − d 0, 1− c2
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Table VII
THE UTILITY MATRIX OF ONE TRANSACTION UNDER PERFECT MONITORING
worker 2
CN CA SN SA
worker 1
CN
γ/2− c1 −c1 − d γ − c1 γ − c1 − d
γ/2− c2 γ − c2 − s2 0 −s2
CA
γ − c1 − s1 γ/2− c1 − s1 − d γ − c1 − s1 γ − c1 − s1 − d
−c2 − d γ/2− c2 − s2 − d −d −s2 − d
SN
0 −d γ/2 −d
γ − c2 γ − c2 − s2 γ/2 γ − s2
SA
−s1 −s1 − d γ − s1 γ/2− s1 − d
γ − c2 − d γ − c2 − s2 − d −d γ/2− s2 − d
And the ex-ante utility of worker 2 is
v2 =Pr(p1 < p2 < p1 + d)(1− c2 − s2)+
Pr(p2 > p1 + d)(1− c2)
=1/2− c2/2− s2d+ (s2d2)/2
(28)
Case II: (S,S), i.e., both worker 1 and worker 2 choose S.
The pay-off matrix showing utilities for Case (S,S) appears in
Table IV. The ex-ante utility of worker 1 is
v1 = Pr(p2 < p1 < p2 + d)(1− s1) + Pr(p1 > p2 + d)
= 1/2− s1d+ (s1d2)/2
(29)
And the ex-ante utility of worker 2 is
v2 = Pr(p1 < p2 < p1 + d)(1− s2) + Pr(p2 > p1 + d)
= 1/2− s2d+ (s2d2)/2
(30)
Case III: (C,S), i.e., worker 1 chooses C and worker 2
chooses S. The pay-off matrix showing utilities for the case
of (C,S) appears in Table V. The ex-ante utility of worker 1
is
v1 = Pr(p2 + c1 < p1 < p2 + c1 + d)(1− c1 − s1)
+ Pr(p1 > p2 + c1 + d)(1− c1)
= [d− (c1 + d)2/2](1− c1 − s1)
+ (1− c1 − d)2(1− c1)/2
(31)
And the ex-ante utility of worker 2 is
v2 = 0 (32)
Case IV : (S,C), i.e., worker 1 chooses S and worker 2
chooses C. The pay-off matrix showing utilities for Case (C,S)
appears in Table VI. The ex-ante utility of worker 1 is
v1 = 0 (33)
And the ex-ante utility of worker 2 is
v2 = Pr(p1 + c2 < p2 < p1 + c2 + d)(1− c2 − s2)
+ Pr(p2 > p1 + c2 + d)(1− c2)
= [d− (c2 + d)2/2](1− c2 − s2)
+ (1− c2 − d)2(1− c2)/2
(34)
B. Utilities
We first give the pay-off matrix which shows the utility of
each worker in one-period under perfect monitoring, where
the total reward is γ. The utility matrix of one-period under
perfect monitoring is in TABLE VII. The expected payoff of
ith-worker is determined by his adopted actions, his current
rating label as well as his opponent under the monitoring error
probabilities ε1 and ε2, which can be derived as follows:
viCN (θ, θ˜) = A× Vi ×AT
viCA(θ, θ˜) = B × Vi ×AT
viSN (θ, θ˜) = C × Vi ×AT
viSA(θ, θ˜) = D × Vi ×AT
(36)
The array Vi is directly derived from Table VII, which is
shown at the top of the next page. The order of strategies for
the assigned probabilities in A, B, C and D are CN, CA, SN
and SA as shown in the following, respectively.
A = [(1− ε1)(1− ε2), (1− ε1)ε2, ε1(1− ε2), ε1ε2]
B = [(1− ε1)ε2, (1− ε1)(1− ε2), ε1ε2, ε1(1− ε2)]
C = [ε1(1− ε2), ε1ε2, (1− ε1)(1− ε2), (1− ε1)ε2]
D = [ε1ε2, ε1(1− ε2), (1− ε1)ε2, (1− ε1)(1− ε2)]
(37)
Given a fixed pricing scheme ψ under the proposed rating
protocol P , there exists a unique stationary rating distribution
{ηtP(θ)} as shown in Eq.(5), then Eq.(36) can be rewritten as
viCN (θ) =
∑1
θ˜=0 η(θ˜)v
i
CN (θ, θ˜)
viCA(θ) =
∑1
θ˜=0 η(θ˜)v
i
CA(θ, θ˜)
viSN (θ) =
∑1
θ˜=0 η(θ˜)v
i
SN (θ, θ˜)
viSA(θ) =
∑1
θ˜=0 η(θ˜)v
i
SA(θ, θ˜)
(38)
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